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Information Systems (IS) Security Training 
Approaches* 
Employees’ non-compliance with IS security procedures is a key concern for organizations. To tackle this proble
m, there exist several training approaches aimed at changing employees’ behavior. However, the extant literat
ure does not examine the elementary characteristics of IS security training, such as the ways in which IS security 
training differs from other forms of training. We argue that IS security training needs a theory that both lays down
 these elementary characteristics and explains how these characteristics shape IS security training principles in p
ractice. We advance a theory that suggests that IS security training has certain elementary characteristics that 
separate it from other forms of training, and we set a fundamental direction for IS security training practices. Sec
ond, the theory defines four pedagogical requirements for designing and evaluating IS security training approa
ches. We point out that no existing IS security training approach meets all of these requirements and demonstra
te how to design an IS security training approach that does meet these requirements. Implications for research 
and practice are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
No modern organization can survive without IS security. While the media have called attention to 
hacking and computer viruses as visible hazards to computer security, the majority of serious IS 
security problems result from employees failing to comply with basic security procedures related to 
their work (CSI Survey, 2007; Siponen & Vance, 2010). If users do not comply with IS security 
policies, security solutions lose their usefulness (Kruger & Kearney, 2006; Thomson, von Solms & 
Louw, 2006). To ensure that employees follow their companies’ key IS security procedures, 
alternative approaches have been advanced in the literature, such as the use of sanctions and 
deterrence (Straub, 1990; Siponen, Pahnila & Mahmood, 2007), marketing campaigns (McLean, 
1992), and training (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Of these approaches, IS security training is the 
most common approach to improving employees’ IS security behavior (Puhakainen & Siponen, 
2010). Although scholars and practitioners generally agree on the need for organizations to 
implement IS security training, the existing literature does not offer an understanding of the 
elementary characteristics of IS security training, such as how IS security training differs from other 
forms of training. We argue that, in order for IS security training research and practice to develop 
further, there is a need not only to examine the fundamentals of IS security training (how IS security 
training differs from other types of training) but also to provide theory-based advice on how 
scholars and practitioners can design, select, and evaluate the pedagogical merit of different IS 
security training principles. To address these goals, we argue that IS security training needs a 
theory that (i) lays down these elementary characteristics of IS security training, (ii) explains how 
these elementary characteristics shape IS security training principles in practice, and (iii) provides 
models for how IS security training practices can be evaluated pedagogically. 
 
As a step toward remedying this situation, we advance a meta-theory for IS security training that 
addresses these issues. First, this theory suggests that IS security training has certain elementary 
characteristics that separate it from other forms of training. Second, this theory defines four 
pedagogical requirements for designing and evaluating IS security training approaches. We review 
extant IS security training approaches and conclude that no previous approach meets all of these 
requirements. Finally, we illustrate how an IS security training approach can meet these 
requirements and present a research agenda for future research. 
 
The results of this study will be welcomed by scholars and practitioners engaging in IS security 
training. For scholars, this paper will offer a new theoretical contribution, a meta-theory for IS 
security training approaches, which not only provides new understanding of the fundamental 
characteristics of IS security training and how it differs from other forms of training but also 
suggests new principles for designing IS security training approaches. The paper also offers an 
agenda for future research. For practitioners, this study will illustrate how to put our meta-theory to 
practical use by offering important insights into how to improve IS security training in practice 
through the theoretical framework. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section discusses extant IS security 
training approaches and points out the need for a meta-theory of IS security training. We advance 
this meta-theory at the beginning of the third section, including four pedagogical requirements for IS 
security training approaches. We review extant IS security training approaches in section 3.2.1 in 
light of these requirements, finding that no existing IS security training approach meets these 
requirements. At the end of this section, we demonstrate how an IS security training approach can 
meet these requirements. The fourth section outlines implications for practice and research, and 
finally, the fifth section concludes with the paper’s findings.  
2. Previous IS Security Training Approaches 
Thirty-two IS security training approaches for increasing employees’ compliance with IS security 
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Figure 1. Categories of IS Security Training Approaches 
 
Psychological training approaches (five approaches) and training approaches based on learning 
theories (six approaches) are based on theoretical concepts from the fields of psychology, social 
psychology, and education. Security awareness program approaches (10 approaches) view IS security 
training as a method for increasing employees’ IS security awareness. Security awareness programs 
training is just one tool for increasing employees’ compliance with IS security policies, the process 
approaches (eight approaches) introduce IS security training principles in a stepwise manner. While 
other approaches can be applied in any context, context-specific approaches (eight approaches) are 
especially designed for certain types of organizational settings, such as universities. While the previous 
approaches are oriented toward face-to-face learning, computer-based training approaches (six 
approaches) focus on e-learning approaches and computer games. Finally, while the other IS security 
training approaches are designed for improving employees’ behavior in any area of IS security through 
training, the social engineering preventive approach (one approach) is focused on avoiding the 
phenomenon of social engineering in IS security training. 
 
Table 1 presents seven categories, key findings, and the underlying theories 1 of each IS security 
training approach. As can be seen in Table 1, 19 of the 32 approaches are placed under only one of the 
seven categories presented in Figure 1. However, seven approaches are situated under two categories, 
and six approaches belong to three categories. 
 
Table 1. Extant IS Security Training Approaches, Their Key Findings, and Underlying Theories 
ISS training 

















1. Stresses changes in IS security-related attitudes through 
cognitive processing (recognizing, understanding, and 
evaluating persuasive arguments). 
2. Offers concrete guidance on how to achieve behavior 
changes. 











                                                     
1 The word theory is used here in a broad sense: if the IS security training approach includes any references towards applying a 
particular type of research (e.g., models, frameworks, or concepts), then we classify the approach as theory-based. 
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1. Emphasizes participants’ thinking, interpretations, 
knowledge construction, and interaction with the 
environment. 
2. Evaluates and reviews the impact of the IS security 
training on managers’ security behaviors.  
The systematic 
approach to training 




















1. Introduces scenario-based IS security training for 
teaching deception detection.  
2. Mentions users’ experiences and active construction of 
knowledge as essential factors in learning.  
Signal detection 

















1. Emphasizes learners’ needs, former experiences, 
involving users, and improving employees’ job 
performance as the main goals of learning.  
2. Offers guidelines and practical examples to develop, 
implement, deliver, and evaluate IS security awareness 
and training.  
Four basic 






















1. Suggests that actions, experiences, problem-solving 
skills, and critical thinking are essential factors in learning. 
2. Introduces the use of a video game tool in training.  
3. Examines IS security training and awareness policies in 
the target organization.  
Learning principles 
in the area of 



















1. Incorporates cognitive and pedagogical principles in IS 
security training: well-connected knowledge structures, 
personally significant learning experiences, and 
reconstruction of knowledge.  
2. Offers usability and training effectiveness assessments.  
3. Presents suggestions for addressing deficiencies in the 
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1. Applies concepts of social psychology to create more 
effective training by influencing people’s behaviors 
and/or attitudes. 
2. Presents three methods for understanding and 
changing human behavior: a) directly change users’ 
behavior regardless of their attitudes, knowledge, or 
feelings (e.g., instrumental learning), b) change attitudes 
through changes in behavior (e.g., self-persuasion), and 
c) change attitudes through persuasion. 














1. Offers practical guidance for developing and 
assessing security programs, model processes, and 
procedural checklists. 
Expectancy theory, 














1. Introduces an e-learning system based on persuasive 
technology to influence people’s attitudes and behavior 
and to educate users of IS on the safe use of security 
measures.  
2. Examines the effectiveness of the persuasive 
authentication framework. 
A psychological 
framework on  
interactive 













1. Applies social psychology to improve employees’ 
information security beliefs, attitudes, and behavior.  
2. Presents practical recommendations for IS security 
training to encourage people to be more inclined to 
approve of information security policies, the features of 























1. Addresses the need for normative approaches and 
motivation/behavioral theories in organizational IS 
security training.  
2. Aims at making users internalize and commit to the 
organization’s security guidelines. 
The theory of 
intrinsic motivation 
(e.g., Deci, 1975) 










1. Considers IS security training as an effective tool as 
part of the awareness program to reduce human error.  
2. Offers practical strategies and techniques, measures 
awareness, and uses delivery media for implementing 
security awareness.   
3. Considers that changes in behavior are the result of a 
decision-making process.  
4. Includes five phases in an approach to the awareness 
process: managing by fact, goals and objectives, 
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1. Considers the IS security awareness program as an 
element of an overall security program in an organization.  
2. Has the goal of making employees aware of security 
policies, standards, procedures, and guidelines.  
3. Discusses security awareness program goals, IS 
security training needs identification, program 
developments, methods for IS security training, and 











1. Presents instructions for building and evaluating an IS 
security awareness program in a step-by-step manner. 
2. Has the goal of making employees aware of the value 












1. Considers IS security training to be a comprehensive 
and detailed action to teach employees knowledge and 
skills to perform effectively.  
2. Has the goals of reinforcing the desired behavior and 
attitudes toward security, and changing undesired ones 
through repetition.  
3. Offers practical principles for establishing IS security 












1. Introduces guidelines for developing and maintaining a 
corporate information security program and implementing 
security procedures.  
2. Considers the IS security training program to be an 
important corporate security function to make all relevant 
actors responsible for the organization’s information 
assets, aware of the ways to protect them, and in 












1. Considers IS security awareness and training to be a 
part of their security program.  
2. Uses a deterrent countermeasure to increase 
employees’ knowledge of risks, policies, and sanctions in 
the organizational environment, and to provide a baseline 
for security planning and prevention activities. 
Deterrence theory 
(Straub, 1990) and 
















1. Discusses the need for IS security awareness to create 
behavioral changes in the academic context.  
2. Considers training, student education, and campaigning 















1. Introduces an IS security awareness program to 
educate students and employees in the academic 
environment.  
2. Has the training goals of changing people’s attitudes 
and actions related to information security issues and 
developing metrics to measure the audience’s knowledge 
level before and after the program implementation.  
3. Concentrates on describing the planning process that 
includes determination of content, audience identification, 
selection of correct methods of delivery, and branding as 
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1. Has the goal of making employees aware, trained, 
and motivated with respect to their security 
responsibilities and countermeasures in their daily 
work. 
2. Offers practical instruction for the phases of the IS 
security training program: defining objectives, 
identifying requirements and training sources, 
developing and implementing the program, and 








1. Presents guidelines for the IS security training 
program at a strategic level for federal agencies and 
other organizations. 
2. Suggests that the purpose of awareness is to 
change or reinforce users’ security behavior. In turn, 
training aims at developing essential security skills and 











1. Addresses role- and performance-based IS security 
training, which emphasizes actual roles, 
responsibilities, and the individual needs of employees.  
2.Aims to change employees’ attitudes and the 
organizational culture concerning security, and provide 
training with information security knowledge and skills 
to all employees involved with IS.  
3. Supports training needs identification, course 








1. Reviews computer security controls from 
management, operational, and technical viewpoints.  
2. Considers IS security awareness, training, and 
education to be operational controls to improve 
employees’ security attitudes and behavior.  
3. Presents seven phases: a) identifying the scope, 
goals, and objectives, b) identifying the training staff, c) 
identifying the target audience, d) motivating the 
management and employees, e) administering the 
program, f) maintaining the program, and g) evaluating 
the program. 
- 





1. Provides an IS security training curriculum to meet 
job duties and roles.  
2. Reviews phases of the traditional instructional 
system design (ISD) model: a) needs analysis and goal 
formation, b) design, c) development, d) 















1. Introduces a generic intranet-based e-learning 
approach for technically oriented specialists in the case 
organization.  
2. Introduces technical, content-related, and 
pedagogical requirements for the learning environment, 
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1. Examines organizational security awareness training in 
three types of online environments: hypermedia, 
multimedia, and hypertext. 
2. Considers security awareness as three sequenced 
levels of abilities: users’ perception, comprehension, and 
projection of information security risks.  
3. Investigates the impact of information richness on the 
effectiveness of online IS security training approaches 







1. Discusses IS security training as part of the 
development and implementation of an IS security policy 










1. Introduces basic definitions of measures to establish 
the training and awareness framework with respect to 
specific training needs and actions within the healthcare 
environment. 
2. Has the goal to make all employees know, understand, 
and accept security basics and procedures as part of their 











1. Introduces three approaches for IS security awareness 
in the university environment: a discussion session, a 
checklist, and a Web-based tutorial.  
2. Has the objective to increase users’ understanding of 
security and motivate users to act in a secure manner.  
3. Considers a discussion session as a discursive 
approach and a Web-based tutorial as an online tutorial 
approach in terms of IS security training, while a checklist 








1. Introduces IS security training and awareness program 
including briefings for new employees, seminars for 












1. Presents guidelines for the IS security training program 
and the implementation of customized security policies as 
prevention activities for social engineering.  
2. Considers employees’ awareness of security policies as 
the most effective issue to prevent social engineering. 
2. Focuses on policies and procedures as well as on a 
continuous awareness program that is imperative for IS 













1. Introduces a prototype software tool for self-paced IS 
security training, including three modes of operation: 
exploration mode (investigation of security measures and 
different types of security), evaluation mode (scenario-




To summarize the literature review of the extant IS security training approaches, while previous studies 
have echoed the importance of IS security training in organizations, no study has attempted to lay down 
fundamentals of IS security training, starting with issues such as identifying the fundamental nature of IS 
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security training, and how it differs from other types of training. This is not a surprise, since only 12 out 
of the 32 IS security training approaches summarized in Table 1 include any kind of theory or theoretical 
concepts. Of these 12 theory-based approaches, six approaches apply learning theories (Puhakainen, 
2006; Heikka, 2008; Biros, 2004; Herold, 2005; Cone et al., 2007; Greitzer et al., 2007); six approaches 
employ theories from the field of psychology or social psychology (Biros, 2004; Thomson & von Solms, 
1998; Roper et al., 2006; Forget et al., 2007; Kabay, 2002; Siponen, 2000); and one approach uses 
criminology (Straub & Welke, 1998). The other IS security training approaches (n=20) do not include 
any theoretical foundations (Table 1). Similar findings are echoed by Puhakainen and Siponen (2010), 
who report the lack of pedagogical theories in the IS security training literature and highlight the need for 
IS security training studies based on proper pedagogical theories. We argue that before any 
pedagogical theory can be selected on which to base an IS security training approach, a meta-level 
examination of the fundamental nature of IS security training is needed. We maintain that only when we 
have an understanding of such fundamentals of IS security training we are in a position to select proper 
pedagogical theories on which to base IS security training approaches. 
 
Therefore, we argue that IS security training needs a meta-theory that (i) lays down these elementary 
characteristics of IS security training, (ii) explains how these elementary characteristics shape IS 
security training principles in practice, and (iii) provides models on how IS security training practices can 
be evaluated pedagogically. We present such a theory next.  
3. Toward a New Meta-Theory for Designing IS Security Training 
Approaches 
Gregor (2006) distinguishes between five theory types in IS research: (1) analysis, (2) explanation, (3) 
prediction, (4) explanation and prediction, and (5) design and action. Niiniluoto (1993) calls the first four 
of these types descriptive (they explain, understand, or predict the world, human behavior, culture, etc.). 
He labels the last type of scientific enquiry “design science,” which focuses on how things ought to be in 
order to meet a certain goal (the technical norm in terms of von Wright, 1972). The descriptive theories 
are, therefore, interested in knowledge, and in the accuracy of information about the world, culture, 
man, society, etc. The correctness of the knowledge is typically estimated in terms of truth or 
truthlikeness (Niiniluoto, 1999). In the case of design and action (Gregor, 2006) or design science 
(Niiniluoto, 1993), success is not defined in terms of true or false but effectiveness related to intended 
use (Niiniluoto, 1993; von Wright, 1972).  
 
Against this backdrop, we argue that the ultimate objective of IS security training (theory) is design and 
action (Gregor, 2006) or design science (Niiniluoto, 1993), since the objective is goal-oriented. That is, 
the aim of IS security training theory is to produce theoretically informed guidance on how to design 
effective training approaches. In this case, “effective” means that employees will comply with IS security 
policies. However, before such approaches can be developed, we need to understand the fundamental 
nature of IS security training, provided that it sets the fundamental direction for IS security training 
practices. To find a framework that allows us to define the fundamental characteristics of IS security 
training and explains how these characteristics have an effect on IS security training practices, we need 
a framework that is both descriptive and action guiding (design and action). To this end, Hare’s (1952, 
1963, 1981) meta-theory of three levels of thinking is ideal. This theory is descriptive and prescriptive. 
As for the former, the theory describes maturity levels in relation to how people form action-guiding 
principles. We apply Hare’s meta-theory to sketch the structure of our new meta-theory for designing IS 
security training approaches (Figure 2). 
 
The meta-level refers to fundamental questions, such as “What is IS security training?” and “How does 
IS security training differ from other types of training?” (Figure 1). The intuitive thinking level refers to 
conventional activities in practice. The critical thinking level, lying between the meta- and intuitive 
thinking levels, is needed to test the validity of our conventional actions and form new guidance in novel 
situations when needed (Hare, 1981). Via the critical thinking level, in our context, those at the intuitive 
level apply principles such as their education, upbringing, and personal experience to understand IS 
security training. People who simply follow their intuitive-level principles, without ever questioning them, 
reside at this level throughout their lives. For example, a practitioner engaging in IS security training who 
uses the same training method that his supervisor used when educating him, without ever questioning 
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the validity of this method, stays at the level of intuitive thinking. However, when people critically ponder 
the validity and effectiveness of their conventional principles, they move to critical-level thinking. Such 
moves may be prompted by feedback from other people, self-critique, feedback from learners, or hints 
that the IS security training does not work as desired. At the critical level, people can form new 
imperatives and ways of acting with respect to IS security training, which they then implement at the 
level of intuitive thinking. This means that the principles at the intuitive level can be overridden; they can 
be modified, refined, or omitted (see Hare, 1981). Or in a case where two principles are in conflict, 
people can override one to follow the other. Next, we describe these levels of thinking, starting from the 
meta-level. 
 
Figure 2. A Framework for the meta –
theory of designing IS security training 
approaches based on Hare’s theory of 
three levels of thinking (1952; 
1963;1981)
               




features of IS 
security training
Critical thinking level: 
The pedagogical 
requirements for IS 
security training
Intuitive thinking 
level: The practice 
of IS security 




























Figure 2. A Framework for the Meta-Theory of Designing IS Security Training    
 Approaches Based on Hare’s Theory of Three Levels of Thinking  
 (1952; 1963; 1981) 
 
3.1. Meta-Level Thinking: The Nature and Existentialistic Features of IS 
Security Training 
Meta-level thinking encompasses issues such as the meaning of learning in the context of IS 
security training or the fundamental characteristic of IS security training. Issues at this level are 
important because they help us to understand how IS security training differs from other types of 
training. We argue that it differs because of its nature and existentialistic features, which we 
discuss next. 
3.1.1. The Fundamental Nature of IS Security Training 
Based on non-cognitivism (Hare, 1963) and the theory of persuasion (Stevenson, 1944), we argue 
that the nature of IS security training is non-cognitive and persuasive. This nature contrasts with 
other types of training, such as university education, which is descriptive (hence, cognitive), 
provides scientific facts, and does not seek to influence learners’ attitudes and behavior in the 
manner of persuasive training. IS security training is persuasive and non-cognitive because 
information procedures, similar to moral norms, require more normative training approaches than 
those employed in learning facts (Siponen, 2000). Indeed, compared to fact-telling educative 
strategies (presentation of the facts), persuasive approaches are more effective in situations where 
the level of commitment to change is low (Hayes 2010). This low level of employees’ commitment 
to complying with IS security policies is widely mentioned in the literature (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
IS security procedures are also non-cognitive because they are created within an organizational 
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context, and not necessarily based on scientific or moral inquiry (as are the creation of facts and 
moral norms, respectively). Following non-cognitivism as a philosophical doctrine, IS security 
procedures are utterances expressing organizations’ non-cognitive attitudes toward how employees 
ought to behave in a secure manner. The expressional side of IS security procedures resembles 
cognitivism at first sight, in that this procedure seems to have a true value, although it does not. 
Since IS security procedures are incapable of being objectively true or false, they are non-
cognitive: They do not describe any factual features. For example, “This computer is red” is a 
cognitive statement, for which a truth-value can be resolved through scientific scrutiny. However an 
IS security procedure, such as “Do not share your passwords with peers” is not a fact; it does not 
have an objective truth-value.2 
 
In addition to a non-cognitive and persuasive nature, other factors are characteristic of IS security 
training. While other types of organizational training for white-collar employees can be persuasive 
and non-cognitive, such as training on fire safety procedures the emphasis of IS security training is 
usually on daily work situations (Siponen & Vance 2010). For example, fire safety training for white-
collar employees typically focuses on exceptional work situations, such as how to evacuate the 
building when there is a fire, but most IS security training focuses on routine work procedures, such 
as logging out of the computer every time the employees leave their computers (Siponen & Vance 
2010; Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). While IS security training can also cover exceptional work 
situations (e.g., how to recover after an earthquake), such situations concern a limited number of 
employees, such as IT and IT security staff. Hence, IS security training for ordinary white-collar 
employees focuses on routine activities, and thus, should have relevance to employees’ daily work 
(Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). 
3.1.2. Existentialistic Features of IS Security Training 
Along with the persuasive and non-cognitive nature of IS security training, three existentialistic 
features are characteristic of the need for IS security training: (1) existence of security-sensitive 
organizational assets; (2) threats toward them; and (3) different technical, social, and organizational 
mechanisms for protecting the organization’s assets (protection mechanisms) (modified from 
Siponen, Baskerville & Heikka, 2006). The absence of these features would make IS security 
training unnecessary. For example, if there are no assets of value in the organization, or if there are 
no threats to the organization, there is no need for IS security or for IS security training. Thus, IS 
security training must ensure that the employees understand the security-sensitive nature of 
organizational assets. If employees lack this understanding, the IS security training is meaningless 
and arbitrary from the viewpoint of the substance. IS security training also needs to introduce 
relevant threats to employees in a pedagogically meaningful manner. Finally, IS security training 
must be focused on achieving the objective of putting mechanisms in place that are able to protect 
security-sensitive organizational assets from threats. These three existentialistic features set the 
fundamental direction (general aim) of IS security training. 
 
Related to these existentialistic features, IS security training has two characteristics that are in 
contrast to many other types of organizational training: (1) voluntariness vs. mandatoriness in using 
the protection mechanisms and (2) the intangible nature of the information security threats and 
assets. The first characteristic (voluntariness vs. mandatoriness) means that while the use of some 
protection mechanisms can be forced through technical solutions (e.g., restricting Internet access), 
and compliance with IS security procedures is typically mandatory (i.e., required in IS security 
policies), employees can bypass most protection mechanisms (e.g., leave their computer unlocked, 
send confidential e-mail without encryption, open links to infected websites). This is different from 
training in the use of the system, for example. If a new IS is deployed in an organization, the 
employees may have to use the system, because that may be the only way to perform their work. 
For instance, a travel agent may be forced to use a new travel system, whether he likes it or not.  
 
The second characteristic is the intangible nature of IS security threats and assets, meaning that 
the consequences of IT and the lack of information security may be difficult for employees to see. 
This is different from fire safety, for example. Most people have seen a fire, but who has seen a 
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password being cracked? In other words, compared to the IS security risks of an organization’s 
information assets, fire safety training, for example, concentrates on more concrete risks that can 
threaten organizations’ facilities and employees’ health or their lives. If employees do not 
understand the consequences of their actions, say, the negative consequences for selecting an 
easy to guess password, then why would they comply with IS security policies requiring passwords 
that are difficult to guess? Therefore, it is no surprise that IS security researchers have observed 
the difficulty employees have in understanding IS security assets and threats (Shawn et al., 2009). 
 
From the discussion of the nature of IS security training, and the existentialistic features, which 
differentiate IS security training from other types of training, we arrive at the following meta-level 
requirements:  
 
First meta-level requirement for IS security training approaches: An IS security training approach 
must be based on the understanding that the nature of IS security training is persuasive and non-
cognitive for influencing employees’ mainly routine work situations. 
 
Second meta-level requirement for IS security training approaches: An IS security training approach 
must focus on the existentialistic features of IS security training, including understanding the 
voluntariness vs. mandatoriness in using the protection mechanisms, and the intangible nature of 
information security threats and assets.  
 
We now focus on the preferred pedagogical requirements to be used in order to meet these two 
meta-level requirements for designing IS security training approaches.  
3.2. Critical-Level Thinking 
The critical-level thinking (Hare, 1981) applied to this context concerns selecting the proper 
pedagogical principles for carrying out IS security training in practice. Given that this study 
examines the preferred pedagogical principles for IS security training, the study scrutinizes 
paradigms of learning—behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, and social constructivism (Hung, 
2001)—to find the most appropriate paradigm for this context. Meta-orientations are helpful for 
selecting the most suitable paradigm of learning for IS security training. In terms of Hare’s (1981) 
work, these theories help us to determine the most appropriate critical-level requirements for IS 
security training approaches. Next, we illustrate this framework (learning paradigms and meta-
orientations), and derive from it four pedagogical requirements at the critical level. We then analyze 
the extent to which the existing IS security training approaches meet these pedagogical 
requirements. 
3.2.1. Paradigms of Learning and Features of Meta-Orientations 
Compared to the paradigms of learning, meta-orientations allow us to more concretely examine IS 
security training approaches. Meta-orientations refer to the fundamental educational philosophy 
underlying any intentional interaction designed to facilitate learning and achieving educational goals 
(Miller & Seller, 1985; Cheung & Wong, 2002). Paradigms of learning and meta-orientations are 
interrelated; paradigms of learning form a theoretical basis for meta-orientations, which are used to 
analyze IS security training approaches. Table 2 summarizes the learning paradigms and features 
of meta-orientations. 
 
Three meta-orientations—transmission, transaction, and transformation—have five dimensions. 
The first is the psychological context of learning. As can be seen from Table 2, different meta-
orientations are linked with three paradigms of learning (behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism 
and social constructivism): the transmission meta-orientation favors behavioristic principles, the 
transaction meta-orientation is influenced by cognitivism, and the transformation meta-orientation is 
linked with constructivism and social constructivism. The other dimensions are general aims (2), 
content (3), teaching methods (4), and evaluation of learning (5). Next, we discuss these 
dimensions starting from the general aims of IS security, because this dimension (Table 2) sets the 
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Table 2. Features of the Meta-Orientations of Curriculum Design (see MIller & Seller, 1985; 
Miller, 2007) 
 Transmission Transaction Transformation 
1. Paradigm of 
learning as a 
psychological 
context 
Behaviorism Cognitivism Constructivism Social 
constructivism 
2. General aims Reception and 
mastery of pre-
defined contents as 
objective knowledge 
Development of 
















approaches in order 
to transmit knowledge 
and provide external 
reinforcement 
Focus on cognitive 
problem-solving and 
analysis 
Focus on critical 




solving to attain 
personal change 




or authentic problem- 
solving to attain 
communal change 











of evaluation for 
individuals 
Conversational forms 
of evaluation for 
groups 
 
3.2.1.1. General Aims of IS Security Training 
Recognizing the persuasive and non-cognitive nature of IS security training, and the existentialistic 
features of IS security training (training must be connected to protecting valuable assets from threats 
through specific means), we argue that the communal transformation meta-orientation is the preferred 
choice for IS security training.  
 
While it is necessary that employees understand IS security procedures, the aims of IS security training 
are not simply to help employees remember and understand IS security procedures without providing 
an opportunity to analyze or reflect on information, as in transmission-oriented training (Miller, 2007; 
Miller & Seller, 1985). Transmission-oriented IS security training would involve a one-way 
communication of information to employees—“here are the IS security rules”—without any feedback, 
discussion, or activation of thinking processes. Such a transmission-oriented approach would be ideal 
for helping employees to remember and understand pre-determined content (facts, concepts, or 
values); however, given that IS security training is persuasive as discussed in section 3.1, it requires a 
more discursive and persuasive approach. Security guidelines must be justified, and employees need to 
see how the guidelines relate to work situations (Siponen, 2000). Hence, the general aims of 
transmission-oriented training are not suitable for IS security training. 
 
Transaction-oriented training stresses cognitive adaptation through the use of problem-solving skills 
such as analyzing, synthesizing, evaluating, or applying knowledge (Miller, 2007; Miller & Seller, 1985). 
For example, a trainer could presents laws related to IS security, and then ask the learners to apply the 
laws in a predefined scenario that is not connected to the employees’ work tasks. While such 
transaction-oriented training can be persuasive, the problem remains that a transaction-oriented 
approach does not emphasize that the learning situations must be connected to the employees’ own 
working experiences. Consequently, the employees lose the connection of the training material to their 
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Transformation-oriented training is directed toward changing learners’ beliefs and behavior (see Table 
2). We argue that this is also the key purpose of IS security training: to change employees’ IS security 
behavior in such a way that complying with IS security procedures becomes a natural part of the 
employees’ daily activities (Siponen, 2000; Thomson et al., 2006); hence, the nature of IS security 
training is persuasive and cognitive. Even though IS security training can often include transmission- 
and transaction-oriented aims, such as delivering knowledge to employees or developing their cognitive 
abilities or problem-solving skills, these cannot be seen as the overall aims of training. Transformation-
orientated training addresses the need to change behavior by connecting the learning issues, such as 
compliance with information security procedures, to employees’ own work tasks and experiences. 
Hence, learning is based on learners’ previous experiences (Miller & Seller, 1985). This is important 
since previous research shows that new knowledge is best constructed through previous experiences. 
To give an example of transformation-oriented IS security training on good password practices, the 
training would start with a discussion of the relevance of passwords as protection mechanisms in the 
employees’ work situation. The trainer would make clear the assets that each employee protects by 
using passwords, and what the threats and implications are if someone cracks the employees’ 
passwords. The training would further demonstrate what password cracking means, and how it happens 
using examples of the employees’ passwords.  
 
Finally, the transformation orientation includes two different directions for designing training: individual 
and communal. We emphasize the importance of the latter in IS security training, because we argue 
that IS security training is primarily directed toward creating a communal change in employees’ IS 
security behavior—changing the work community’s prevailing organizational work practices and 
developing the organizations’ security culture (Dhillon, 2007)—rather than only an individual change 
(see Table 1). We argue that employees’ IS security behavior consists of such shared organizational 
work practices, which, along with formal IS security policies, depend on an organization’s unwritten 
culture, which defines what kinds of behavior are seen as acceptable and unacceptable (see Robbins, 
1993). To influence such shared working practices, we argue that group-oriented training approaches 
are better than individual approaches, because group approaches help employees obtain richer 
knowledge and increased acceptance of the prescribed changes to their behavior (Robbins, 1993). For 
example, educators can organize a discussion section where learners present their own views on, say, 
why they should encrypt sensitive e-mails. Presentation of the different views of group members helps 
their peers understand different reasons for encrypting their e-mails and corrects their own 
misconceptions in the context of their work (e.g., “My e-mails do not contain sensitive information”) and 
encourages higher acceptance of using e-mail encryption in their work. Keeping these issues in mind, 
we argue that the communal transformation meta-orientation is preferred for IS security training.  
 
The general aims of the communal transformation meta-orientation set the direction for selecting other 
features of meta-orientations: psychological context, content, teaching method, and evaluation of 
learning (see Table 2). Next, we discuss the features of meta-orientation. In addition, we put forward 
corresponding pedagogical requirements for IS security training at the critical level derived from the 
communal transformation orientation as part of a meta-theory for designing IS security training. 
3.2.1.2 Pedagogical Requirements for IS Security Training 
(1) First Pedagogical Requirement for IS Security Training: Psychological Context 
As the first pedagogical requirement for IS security training approaches derived from the communal 
transformation meta-orientation, the explicit psychological context—the learning paradigm behind the 
training approach—must be based upon a group-oriented theoretical approach to teaching and learning. 
This will guide training activities (see Fardanesh, 2006; Gibson, 2001; Hinsz, Vollrath & Tindale, 1997). 
Such group-oriented learning theory is needed for IS security training because it is primarily directed 
toward creating communal rather than personal change (see Table 2). This means that employees’ 
compliance with IS security procedures at the individual level only is not enough to assure 
organizational success; rather, the target is communal-level change through communal (or collective) 
learning. Such communal learning develops the group’s collective ability to act more effectively (or 
securely, in the case of IS security training) in a complex work environment, while individuals (or groups) 
are collaborating and learning from each other (Hayes, 2010). Depending on the situation, this may lead 
to collective refinement of the prevailing (IS security) rules or changing the employees’ accepted ways 
of thinking and, further, behaving (Hayes, 2010; Argyris & Schön, 1978).  
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The transmission meta-orientation does not meet this requirement, as this meta-orientation 
emphasizes the stimulus-response system of learning in terms of behaviorism (see Miller & Seller, 
1985). In turn, the transaction meta-orientation is psychologically oriented to cognitive psychology and 
cognitivism. Cognitivism, as an approach to learning, emphasizes individual development of 
cognition. These transmission and transaction meta-orientations consider learning only as an 
individual process in the psychological context. Thus, they do not represent a suitable learning 
approach for IS security training, which requires a communal and group-oriented learning approach. 
The communal group-oriented approach, ideally, leads to organizational improvement in the level of 
the overall IS security culture. 
 
In addition, humanistic psychology (Maslow, 1970; Rogers, 1969), as the psychological context within 
the transformation meta-orientation (see Miller & Seller, 1985), emphasizes individual learning, and 
thus, for the aforementioned reasons, is not a suitable learning paradigm for IS security training. The 
humanistic approach to learning has much in common with the constructivist approach, as both 
emphasize the active role of the learner and the interactive character of learning. Humanism 
emphasizes self-actualization and self-transcendence (Miller & Seller, 1985), or growth and personal 
integrity (McNeil, 1981). Compared to humanism, constructivism is a more appropriate learning 
paradigm from which to construct meanings of events and ideas, to transform understanding (Ross, 
2002), and to build a connection between a learner’s existing knowledge and what he/she is expected 
to learn (Gagnon & Collay, 2006).  
 
However, social constructivism, the second corresponding psychological context of the transformation 
orientation, meets this first pedagogical requirement, because it stresses social learning, the social 
viewpoint of learning processes, interactions, and knowledge (Palincsar, 1998). Because this learning 
paradigm offers a group-oriented theoretical approach, we argue that social constructivism is the 
most suitable learning paradigm for IS security training.    
 
In addition to communal change being a general aim of IS security training rather than individual 
change (see the section General aim of IS security training), there are other justifications for 
considering social constructivism as the preferred approach for IS security training. First, studies in 
other areas have found that social learning influences a change in individuals’ risk perceptions as 
well as in their protective behavior (e.g., Helleringer & Kohler, 2005; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
These are essential goals in IS security training. For instance, heightened understanding of risks 
related to selecting easy-to-guess passwords can be expected to lead employees to protect the 
valuable documents saved in their computers by complying with the organization’s password 
procedures. Employing social learning in IS security training means including employees’ collective 
experiences in the learning content (e.g., employees’ shared experiences in IS security risks 
related to password use) and collaborative teaching and evaluation methods (e.g., discussion of 
the relevance of IS security risks related to password use in employees’ work, and achieving 
mutual agreement to minimize the occurrence of these risks by adhering to password policies). We 
discuss content, teaching method, and evaluation of learning in more detail in the next sections.  
 
Second, social constructivism includes several characteristics useful for motivating employees to 
change: user participation, involvement, and negotiated agreements (Nadler, 1993; Lines, 2004; 
Hayes, 2010). 
 
Third, previous research reports that employees’ IS security behavior is influenced by other people, 
which is consistent with the principles of social constructivism. For example, employees’ 
compliance intentions or behavior is influenced by management and co-worker attitudes and 
behavioral expectations (Pahnila, Siponen & Mahmood, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009), peer behavior 
(Herath & Rao, 2009), and active participation in workshops (Albrechtsen, 2007; Adams & Sasse, 
1999). 
 
(2) Second Pedagogical Requirement for IS Security Training: Content 
As the second pedagogical requirement for IS security training derived from the communal 
transformation meta-orientation, the training content must be based on the learners’ collective 
experiences and meaning perspectives (see Hmelo-Silver & Barrows, 2008). This is required 
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because, to make IS security policies community-centered, understood, accepted, and 
implemented collectively (not just individually), training must include learners’ shared perceptions of 
these policies in their own work.  
 
Transmission-oriented content is not ideal for IS security training because such content does not 
involve the learners’ collective experiences and meaning perspectives (hence, it does not meet the 
second pedagogical requirement). Rather, knowledge (content) is seen to be objective, unrelated to 
human subjectivity (Brody, 1998), and static (Miller, 2007). The content of transmission-oriented 
training is subject-centered (Miller & Seller, 1985; Miller, 2007). IS security training that introduces 
laws in the area of IS security without tailoring the training to the company’s context and learners’ 
experiences is an example of transmission-oriented training. Such training based on laws would be 
generic for all, and therefore, not connected to the work situations or work experiences of each 
learner.  
 
The transaction orientation emphasizes problem-centered content mainly selected by the teacher, 
but also takes into account the learners’ interests (Miller & Seller, 1985). This orientation stresses 
the learning process and cognitive process skills rather than the understanding of facts (Cheung & 
Wong, 2002). As an example of transaction orientation in the context of IS security training, 
learners may analyze information security policies or create classifications of information security 
threats and prevention activities provided in the literature. In addition, in the transaction orientation, 
the instructor uses concrete examples or questions in the training session to activate learners’ 
cognitive processing of knowledge. However, the transaction-oriented training content does not 
emphasize communal and experiential characteristics, which are required for effective IS security 
training. 
 
Learner-centered transformation-oriented training stresses learners’ experiences and involvement 
in the community (Miller & Seller, 1985). Furthermore, as new knowledge emerges from the 
community through collaborative knowledge building (Hmelo-Silver & Barrows, 2008), the 
knowledge is community-centered. Thus, transformation meta-orientation content is based on the 
collective experiences and meaning perspectives of the learners, meeting the second requirement 
for IS security training. Using transformation-oriented training, the meaning and relevance of IS 
security laws are discussed within the context of the company’s actual work situations. In addition, 
employees’ experiences in this area are taken into account, because the substance of the 
training—laws, in this case—is based on learners’ previous understanding. Finally, such employee 
experiences are shared and communicated during the training. 
 
(3) Third Pedagogical Requirement for IS Security Training: Teaching Method 
As the third pedagogical requirement for IS security training derived from the communal 
transformation meta-orientation, teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order to 
reveal and produce collective knowledge (see Mezirow, 1991; Palincsar, 1998; Dillenbourg, Baker, 
Blaye & O’Malley, 1996; Rochelle & Teacley, 1995). Such teaching methods are needed in IS 
security training because they enable communal change in employees’ IS security attitudes and 
behavior (see Table 2).  
 
This requirement is not met in transmission-oriented training, where the teaching method is a one-
way distribution of knowledge, the teacher’s role is directive, and learners are passive participants 
(Miller, 2007). In the context of IS security training, teaching methods characterized by the 
transmission orientation emphasize instructor-led activities to deliver security messages. The 
teacher presents security procedures to learners through different audio-visual means (e.g., face-
to-face and computer-based presentations) without paying attention to learning processes, 
problem-solving assignments (transaction), or individual or communal reflection of experiences 
(transformation).  
 
In the transaction orientation, teaching methods are not focused on collaborative learning in order 
to reveal and produce collective knowledge as required from IS security training. Instead, teaching 
methods focus on cognitive problem-solving through applications, analyses, and syntheses of the 
learning material (Bloom, 1956; Miller & Seller, 1985). In these cases, training includes cognitive 
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problem-solving activities that are mainly defined by the teacher, and that demand active 
information processing by the learners. As an example in the context of IS security is training, 
students may be asked to recognize and classify IS security threats and prevention activities in 
imaginary scenarios created by the teacher that relate to predefined classifications in the IS 
security literature.  
 
Transformation-oriented teaching methods, in contrast, make connections between learners and 
their actual working practices (Miller & Seller, 1985). Thus, learning occurs through critical 
reflection, authentic problem-solving, or communication. Critical reflection is when a person or a 
group of people ponder the validity of their actions, thoughts, and feelings in order to change them 
(Mezirow, 1991). Accordingly, in the context of IS security training, teaching methods that create 
communal knowledge must emphasize discussions concerning experiences, attitudes, and 
behaviors toward IS security issues. The communal creation of experiences includes collaboration 
(which engages each member of the group) in order to collectively solve a common problem or 
reach an agreement (Dillenbourg et al., 1996; Rochelle & Teacley, 1995). The goal of discussion is 
to reflect on collective experiences and achieve mutual understanding and agreement, which meets 
the third requirement for IS security training. 
 
(4) Fourth Pedagogical Requirement for IS Security Training: Evaluation of Learning 
As the fourth pedagogical requirement for IS security training derived from communal 
transformative meta-orientation, evaluation of learning should emphasize experiential and 
communication-based methods from the viewpoint of the learning community (see Miller & Seller, 
1985; Birenbaum, 1996). These methods are preferred in IS security training because the goal of 
training is to construct collaborative knowledge (i.e., to mutually understand new IS security 
procedures).  
 
Transmission-oriented training does not meet this goal, as the evaluation concentrates on an 
objective measurement of training goals with pre-defined responses. Examples of the evaluation 
representing the transmission orientation in the context of IS security training are formal exams, 
tests, or competence-based evaluations in authentic situations typically conducted after a training 
session. A web-based training evaluation asking learners about IS security procedures (e.g., a 
good password has more than 12 characters, “yes” or “no”) with multiple-choice-style answers is an 
example of a transmission-oriented evaluation of training. 
 
As for transaction-oriented training, evaluation focuses on examining learners’ information 
processing through cognitive problem-solving tasks. Examples of transaction-oriented evaluation 
tasks in the context of IS security training include verbal or written exercises to analyze information 
or apply learned issues in a similar context. Thus, transaction-oriented teaching methods and 
evaluation tasks are highly similar in nature (see “Third pedagogical requirement for IS security 
training: Teaching method”). An example of this is case-based training, where employees are asked 
to point out how many IS security violations each case contains, and teachers assess whether the 
employees’ results are relevant according to some predefined criteria. 
 
Evaluation in transformative training includes informal, experimental, and open-ended forms of 
evaluation for individuals or groups (Miller & Seller, 1985). Learners are active participants who 
share responsibility in the evaluation process through self-evaluation, reflection, collaboration, and 
continuous dialogue with the IS security trainer during the IS training sessions. The evaluation 
methods include feedback during work or assignments, group projects, peer evaluations, and 
interviews (Birenbaum, 1996). An example of an assignment could be one where the employees 
are asked to indicate how the training has improved their skills, knowledge, or behavior. Ideally, in 
transformative training, the learners and IS security trainers discuss such issues, and this 
communal sharing of knowledge results in new learning experiences. In this way, evaluation is a 
key part of the continuous learning process, not an end in itself. These evaluation methods are 
experiential and communication-based, and thus, fulfill the fourth requirement for IS security 
training. Next, we point out the extent to which the existing IS security training approaches meet 
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3.3. Existing IS Security Training Approaches and the Four Pedagogical 
Requirements 
Thirty-two IS security training approaches have been developed aimed at improving employees’ IS 
security behavior in the organizational context.3 Table 3 shows the extent to which the existing IS 
security training approaches meet the four pedagogical requirements formulated earlier. To 
summarize, none of the IS security approaches meets all four pedagogical requirements. “X” means 
that an IS security training approach fulfills the requirement, and “–” signifies that the approach does 
not fulfill the requirement (for more details, see Appendix 1). 
 
Table 3. The Degree to which Extant IS Security Training Approaches Meet the Four 
Pedagogical Requirements for IS Security Training Approaches 
IS security training 
approaches 





(2) Fulfills the 
requirement for 
the content  
(3) Fulfills the 
requirement for 
teaching method  







- X X X 
Social psychological 
recommendations 
approach (Kabay, 2002) 
- X X - 
Andragogical approach 
(Herold, 2005) - - - X 
Strategic approach 
(Wilson and Hash, 2003) - - - X 
Pedagogical requirements: (1) the explicit psychological context must be based upon the group-oriented 
theoretical approach of teaching and learning; (2) the training content must be based on collective 
experiences of the learners; (3) teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order to reveal and 
produce collective knowledge; and (4) evaluation of learning should emphasize experiential and 
communication-based methods from the viewpoint of the learning community. 
Analyzed IS security training approaches, which do not fulfill any of the pedagogical requirements: 
Constructive instruction approach (Heikka, 2008); Constructive scenario approach (Biros, 2004); Cyber 
security game approach (Cone et al., 2007); Pedagogical game approach (Greitzer et al., 2007); Social 
psychology–oriented approach (Thomson & von Solms, 1998); Motivation theory directive approach (Roper et 
al., 2006); Persuasive technology approach (Forget et al., 2007); Normative approach (Siponen, 2000); 
Counteractive approach (McIlwraith, 2006); Security ensuring approach (Peltier, 2000); Communication-
oriented approach (Desman, 2002); Promotional approach (Rudolph et al., 2002); Stakeholder approach, 
(Kovacich & Halibozek, 2003); Deterrence approach, (Straub & Welke, 1998); Academic environment 
approach (Kajava & Siponen, 1997); University environment approach (McCoy & Thurmond Fowler, 2004); 
Preventive approach (Nosworthy, 2000); Competence approach (Wilson et al., 1998); Operational controls 
approach (NIST, 1995); ISD approach (Hansche, 2001); Traditional e-learning approach (Kajava et al., 2003); 
Hypermedia instruction approach (Shawn et al., 2009); Policy creation approach (Gaunt, 1998); Healthcare 
environment approach (Furnell et al., 1997); Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox et al., 
2001); Briefing approach (Markey, 1989); Social engineering preventive approach (Mitnick & Simon, 2002) 
and; Active e-learning approach (Furnell et al., 2002). 
 
 
                                                     
3 Studies on education for information security professionals are outside the scope of this review (e.g., Goel & Pon, 2006; Bishop, 
2000; Romney, Higby, Stevenson, & Blackham, 2004; Ryan, 2003; Sharma & Sefchek, 2007). In addition, articles concentrating on 
evaluating training approaches (e.g., Kruger & Kearney, 2006; Martins & Eloff, 2001; Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005; 
Dodge, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007) are omitted, because they focus only on how to measure the effectiveness of these 
approaches, not the actual development and implementation of training. In addition, articles referring to training as a part of an IS 
security awareness program are excluded if the characteristics of these training efforts are not described in detail (e.g., Bray, 2002; 
Information Security Forum, 2005; Leach, 2003; Murray, 1991; Olnes, 1994; Parker, 1999; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001; 
Spurling, 1995; Stacey, 1996; Telders, 1991). 
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One study (Puhakainen, 2006) meets the last three requirements, another (Kabay, 2002) meets the 
second and third requirements, and two (Herold, 2005; Wilson & Hash, 2003) meet the last 
requirement. However, the features of the existing IS security training approaches that fulfill these 
pedagogical requirements are not guided by the social constructivist learning paradigm or the 
instructional design approach. Therefore, these are considered to be only single features and not in 
the essence of the IS security training practice. Given that no existing IS security training approach 
meets all four pedagogical requirements, the following section advances an example of a new 
training approach that meets these four requirements. 
3.4. Intuitive-level thinking: Example of an IS security training approach that 
meets the four pedagogical requirements 
In the previous sections, we advanced a meta-theory for an IS security training approach, mirroring 
Hare’s theory of three levels of thinking. Accordingly, we put forth two meta-level requirements: 1) 
An IS security training approach must be based on the understanding that the nature of IS security 
training is persuasive and non-cognitive; 2) An IS security training approach must focus on the 
existentialistic features of IS security training. These two requirements informed the search for 
pedagogical requirements at the critical-thinking level. As a result, we laid out four pedagogical 
requirements for IS security training approaches. This section demonstrates a potential 
pedagogical approach to IS security training that meets these four pedagogical requirements. 
3.4.1. Searching for a Proper Instructional Design Approach Fulfilling the 
Pedagogical Requirements for IS Security Training 
The first pedagogical requirement for IS security training is that the explicit psychological context of 
IS security training must be based upon the group-oriented theoretical approach to teaching and 
learning. In seeking candidate approaches that meet the first pedagogical requirement for IS 
security training, constructivist instructional design theories constitute ideal theoretical bases for 
designing IS security training, for two reasons. First, a constructivist instructional design theory is 
beneficial in training design because this theory expresses concrete instructions for training, unlike 
the four high-level pedagogical requirements derived from the social constructivist learning 
paradigm4 (Yilmaz, 2008; Wasson, 1996). Second, constructivist instructional design approaches 
are also relevant for social constructivist instructional design. The key difference between them is 
that constructivism has the individual learner viewpoint and social constructivism emphasizes a 
social viewpoint toward learning with respect to general aims, content, teaching methods, and 
evaluation (see Table 2). 
 
Of the alternative constructivist instructional design approaches (see Fardanesh, 2006; Kirschner, 
Sweller & Clark, 2006), we use experiential learning as an example to illustrate how to meet the 
four requirements, because it is the preferred learning approach in the organizational context 
(Pavlica, Holman, & Thorpe, 1998; Backström, 2004; Dixon, 1999); it is work-based learning 
(Honey & Mumford, 1992); and it achieves the raising of group consciousness, community action, 
and social change (Weil & McGill, 1989). Thus, we deem the experiential learning approach to be a 
suitable approach for changing employees’ IS security attitudes and behaviors. 
 
A leading experiential learning approach is Kolb’s (1984) theory of experiential learning (see 
Tennant, 1997). We select this theory to form the instructional design part of the IS security training 
approach (which should meet the four pedagogical requirements). Because Kolb’s theory of 
experiential learning does not address the social aspects of learning (Pavlica et al., 1998; Holman, 
Pavlica, & Thorpe, 1997), we add collaborative learning techniques (Barkley, Cross, & Major, 2005) 
to our IS security training approach, in order to achieve effective learning in groups. Collaborative 
learning has been reported to be effective for promoting achievement and productivity (Johnson, 
Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson, & Skon, 1981), and changing attitudes (Springer, Stanne, & Donovan, 
1999). Next, we introduce the IS security training approach, combining experiential learning and 
collaborative learning techniques. 
 
                                                     
4 This is the case since the four pedagogical requirements at the critical level are meta-requirements, i.e., high-level requirements for 
IS security training approaches. 
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3.4.2. The Experiential and Collaborative IS Security Training Approach 
The learning approach involves four prescriptive guidelines based on Kolb’s four-stage cycle (1984): (1) 
Involve Learners’ Concrete Experiences, (2) Engage Reflective Observation, (3) Support Formation of 
Abstract Concepts and Generalizations, and (4) Enable Active Experimentation. These phases of the 
experiential learning cycle in the case of IS security training are summarized in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Modification of Experiential Learning Cycle (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001) in the Context 
of IS Security Training 
 
Complemented by collaborative learning techniques (Barkley et al., 2005), Kolb’s theory of experiential 
learning offers an instructional design approach analogous to collective cognition, which refers to the 
processing of information in groups (Gibson, 2001; Hinsz et al., 1997). Then, these four phases include 
certain processes to make changes in collective thinking and develop effective group decisions and 
actions. We argue that such a training approach stresses the experiences and collective activities of 
learners in order to achieve communal change. The particulars of this approach resemble the features 
of the transformation orientation and of social constructivism (previously presented in this article). Thus, 
this training approach fulfills the first pedagogical requirement for IS security training: The explicit 
psychological context of IS security training must be based upon the group-oriented theoretical 
approach to teaching and learning. Next, we describe each experiential learning phase in order to 
demonstrate how the experiential and collaborative IS security training approach meets the other three 
pedagogical requirements for IS security training.  
 
(1) Involve Learners’ Concrete Experiences 
The learning cycle begins with concrete experiences (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001) that form the basis for 
learning (see Figure 3). In IS security training, the concrete experiences at the initial phase of learning 
are previous experiences learners have had (see Fenwick, 2001; Dixon, 1999) with the existentialistic 
features of IS security training—security-sensitive organizational assets, threats toward them, and 
protection mechanisms. To illustrate this, let us assume that an organization finds insecure e-mail use 
by employees to be a problem. In this case, the employees’ concrete experience with security-sensitive 
organizational assets (e.g., confidential documents), threats toward them (e.g., e-mail eavesdropping), 
and protection mechanisms (e.g., e-mail encryption) related to secure e-mail use will constitute the 
starting point for IS security training.  
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(2) Engage in Reflective Observation 
The second phase, reflective observation (see Figure 3), occurs via retrieving, exchanging, and 
structuring groups’ shared experiences (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001). Then, employees can engage 
in discussions about their concrete experiences, which enable them to react to others’ perspectives 
and practices (Honey & Mumford, 1992) and to map a causal relationship between their work 
practices and respective organizational consequences (Pavlica et al., 1998). In collaborative 
activities, learners generate rich descriptions and analyses through systematic and intentional 
conversations with others, which take into account learners’ personal and interpersonal 
perspectives, former knowledge, and attitudes (Pavlica et al., 1998).  
 
In practice, in the context of IS security training, learners work in small groups to generate 
interpersonal experiences regarding the existentialistic features of IS security training, in order to 
define the experiences’ meanings and implications for the organization. For instance, if the topic of 
the training is to make employees’ e-mail use more secure, their task is to consider what types of 
security-sensitive e-mail require protection, what protection mechanisms enable secure e-mail use, 
in general, which of these practices are valid in their own work, and what threats exist if these 
protection mechanisms are not followed. Thus, while this phase implements collective experiences 
as training content, the phase also involves groups’ interpersonal perspectives toward the 
existentialistic features of IS security training. Hence, this phase meets the second pedagogical 
requirement.  
 
Reflective observation of these collective experiences can be accomplished, for example, through 
the collaborative learning technique called Think-Pair-Share (Barkley et al., 2005), which is 
implemented as follows. First, learners think of existentialistic features with respect to secure e-mail 
use individually, and then share their ideas with a colleague to create a joint response. Next, pairs 
share their ideas in a group of four to expand common viewpoints (Lyman, 1981). Finally, the 
results are visually presented to the whole group by amalgamating them on the blackboard, a 
method that supports learners’ understanding of different aspects and enhances their ability to build 
group consensus on the secure use of e-mail. Hence, teaching methods are focused on 
collaborative learning in the form of group discussions (i.e., Think-Pair-Share) in order to reveal and 
produce collective knowledge. Hence, this phase meets the third pedagogical requirement for IS 
security training: that teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order to reveal and 
produce collective knowledge.  
 
(3) Support Formation of Abstract Concepts and Generalizations 
The third phase, the formation of abstract concepts and generalizations (see Figure 3), involves 
negotiation, interpretation, and evaluation processes (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001). In this phase, the 
meanings of collective experiences are interpreted in the organizational context by comparing them 
to organizational viewpoints (Honey and Mumford, 1992), as stated in the organization’s written 
security policies. The instructor needs to introduce the organization’s e-mail policies, related 
security-sensitive organizational assets, threats toward them, and protection mechanisms. Building 
on the aforementioned exercises in the previous phase (e.g., Think-Pair-Share), the learners 
analyze the similarities and differences between the group’s experiences and the presented 
organizational viewpoint. This phase is an examination of the overlap between organizational 
regulations and employees’ communal experiences. Some variations are possible in cases where 
existing policies and instructions do not reconcile with actual work practices.  
 
Similar to the previous phase, this phase involves collective experiences as training content, 
thereby fulfilling the second pedagogical requirement: that the training content must be based on 
the learners’ collective experiences. This phase also involves collaborative learning in the form of 
group discussion in order to reveal and produce collective knowledge; hence, this phase fulfills the 
third pedagogical requirement: that teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order 
to reveal and produce collective knowledge. However, compared to the previous phase, collective 
experiences are now expanded from the group to the organizational level, involving reflection of the 
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(4) Enable Active Experimentation 
The last phase, active experimentation (see Figure 3), refers to integrating collective experiences in 
order to reach decisions and actions (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001). In this phase, employees’ experiences 
(which were previously described and analyzed) are now used to develop new organizational practices 
(Pavlica et al., 1998). To put this into the context of IS security training, and to take the secure use of e-
mail as an example, concrete e-mail use instructions are established in a manner that solves the 
original problem—insecure e-mail use by employees—by combining individual (first phase), 
interpersonal (second phase), and organizational (third phase) viewpoints with respect to the 
existentialistic features of secure e-mail use.  
 
The ultimate purpose of the fourth phase is to define how formal e-mail policies and instructions are 
actually experienced by employees, and how the policies can be applied by the learners. For example, 
the instructor can deliver written policies to learners with open spaces for learners’ possible 
supplements and/or corrections. This document can also function as a “learning contract” that supports 
the transfer of employees’ learned knowledge and attitudes (for example, to secure e-mail practices) 
(Kirkpatrick, 2006; Knowles, 1986).  
 
As part of the last phase to ensure effective collective learning, learners need to be able to test their 
new understanding in practice (Backström, 2004). In addition to describing, analyzing, and creating 
organizational practices, learners are required to implement changes in their work (Pavlica et al., 1998). 
To validate a new practice in an organization, potential changes in the policies and instruction must be 
accepted by management. Employees need to consciously observe their e-mail use practices, and must 
execute applicable changes based on what they have learned in training. Finally, these new 
experiences are evaluated through group interviews, which are then used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the training from the learners’ perspective. If required, these new experiences can function as a 
starting point for a second learning cycle (Dixon, 1999). 
 
A function of this phase is to put together the collective experiences of the learners regarding 
existentialistic features in the area of secure use of e-mail, which formed the content of the training in 
the presented example. A learning contract as a concrete form of this collective knowledge can again be 
created through collaborative learning techniques (e.g., Think-Pair-Share). This fourth phase of the 
experiential learning cycle also meets the second and third requirements for IS security training. At the 
same time, after employees have changed and observed their IS security practices related to the topic 
of the training (for example, e-mail use), learning is evaluated using the group interview. Then, the fourth 
pedagogical requirement for IS security training is also fulfilled: that evaluation of learning should 
emphasize experiential and communication-based methods from the viewpoint of the learning 
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Table 4. Phases of Experiential Learning Cycle (Kolb 1984; Gibson 2001) in the Context of IS 
Security Training 






experiences regarding the 
following features in their work 
form the basis of learning:  
1. Sensitive information (e.g., 
personnel data, business and 
strategic decisions, financial, 
customer, and R&D information);  
2. IS security threats (e.g., loss 
of sensitive information due to 
unintentional information leak, 
IS security breach, virus 
infections); 
3. Means to protect sensitive 
information from IS security 
threats (e.g., selecting strong 
passwords, encrypting e-mails, 
making regular backups) 
Employees’ experiences on secure passwords, which will be 
changed during the training, form the basis of learning:  
1. What security-sensitive information in the employees’ 
work environment requires password protection?  
2. Which protection mechanisms constitute secure password 
use, and which of these practices are valid in employees’ 
own work (and why)? 
3. What threats exist if these protection mechanisms are not 
followed? 
 
For example, an HR secretary may think that only personnel 
information (1) needs to be secured with passwords to 
prevent other employees from seeing it (3), but does not 
recognize other areas of sensitive information or IS security 
threats in his work. In addition, he may not recognize why 
passwords need to be changed frequently or why selecting 





Learners work in small groups to 
share their experiences 
regarding secure working 
practices (see Phase 1). To be 
more precise, they describe and 
analyze employees’ collective 
experiences with sensitive 
information, IS security threats, 
and ways to protect sensitive 
information from threats (see 
phase 1) in their work through a 
certain systematic discussion 
procedure called Think-Pair-
Share. 
1. Learners think about secure password practices 
individually (see phase 1). 
2. They share their ideas with colleagues.  
3. Pairs share their ideas in a group of four to expand 
common viewpoints. 
4. These viewpoints are discussed and visually presented to 
all learners, e.g., via the blackboard. 
 
For example, through discussing their password experiences 
with a co-worker, a HR secretary may realize that he also 
has customer-related data in his laptop requiring password 
protection (2). In addition, in the group of four, he realizes 
that to prevent information theft, it might also be necessary 
to use password protection for confidential e-mails (3). 
Finally, because almost all groups stated that it is important 
not to share passwords with other people, the HR assistant 







Through the systematic 
discussion method, learners 
analyze the possible differences 
between a group’s collective 
experiences (formulated in 
phase 2) and the organization’s 
written IS security policies, 
which provide guidelines for 
using different ways to protect 
sensitive information from IS 
security threats. 
First, the instructor introduces the company’s password 
procedures and justifies the protection of security-sensitive 
organizational assets from threats. Second, learners analyze 
the similarities and differences between group experiences 
and the password procedures through a discussion method 
described in a phase 2. 
 
For example, in contrast with the organization’s IS 
procedures, an HR assistant did not find it necessary to use 
strong passwords, which was required by the company’s IS 
security policies. After an illustration of the importance of 
using strong passwords, the employee becomes aware why 
he should use stronger passwords, and why they should be 
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Table 4. Phases of Experiential Learning Cycle (Kolb 1984; Gibson 2001) in the Context of IS 
Security Training (continued) 






Learners establish new 
procedures to protect sensitive 
information from IS security 
threats, use them in practice, and 
evaluate their practical suitability 
through group interviews. 
First, the instructor delivers password use procedures to 
learners with open spaces for feedback. Original procedures 
supplemented with employees’ comments function as a 
concrete form of employees’ collective knowledge, and can 
again be created through a discussion method (e.g., Think-Pair-
Share). All IS security policies need to be discussed, and their 
use should be supported so that employees will apply them. 
 
For example, as a result of the discussion, it is found that, 
although employees understand the rationale behind most 
password procedures, and are willing to comply with them, they 
think that it is inconvenient to remember multiple passwords and 
select strong passwords that need to be changed frequently. 
For that reason, easy selection of strong passwords should be 
supported, for example, through teaching password 
mnemonics. After training, employees need to observe their 
password use and execute changes based on what has been 
decided in the training. These new user experiences are 
evaluated through group interviews, and if required, these can 
form a starting point for a second learning cycle. 
4. Discussion 
This paper advanced a meta-theory for designing IS security training with three levels of thinking: meta-
level, critical level, and intuitive level. Through this theory, we would like to highlight two findings. First, 
at the meta-level, this theory advances fundamental features of IS security training (its non-cognitive 
and persuasive nature, and existentialistic features) and formulates respective meta-level requirements. 
None of the existing studies in the area of IS security training has considered these features. 
 
Second, at the critical-thinking level, based on these meta-level requirements and learning theories, we 
formulated four pedagogical requirements for effective IS security training. None of the existing IS 
security training approaches meets all four pedagogical requirements. Thus, as the second contribution, 
we advanced an example of IS security training, the experiential and collaborative IS security training 
approach, that meets these requirements and provides guidelines that can be overridden for IS security 
training at the intuitive level. 
 
Based on these findings, we suggest three directions for future research. 
4.1. Research Direction 1: Research Methodologies to Validate IS Security 
Training Approaches 
Given the lack of empirical research on IS security training programs (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010), 
we call for four levels of evaluations (Kirkpatrick, 2006) to validate IS security training approaches (these 
are also used to empirically study research directions 2 and 3): 1) user reactions; 2) learning (changes 
in attitudes, knowledge, thinking, or skills); 3) behavior (e.g., how learning is implemented in the 
organization); and 4) results (e.g., decreased frequency of accidents and improved productivity). To 
study users’ reactions, learning, and behavior, training programs can use interviews, observations, and 
surveys. In addition, to study behavior, these programs can employ objective measures. For example, 
users’ objective Internet use behavior can be studied from log files before and after training on the non-
work-related use of the Internet. The objective measures, if available, can be used to study the results, 
as well. For example, the number of malware infections can be analyzed in the long term before and 
after IS security training on protection against malware. To study changes in thinking, we suggest the 
use of integrative complexity (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992). Integrative complexity assumes that 
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the level of thought complexity can be changed by discussion or training (Myyry, 2002; Suedfeld et al., 
1992). Thus, as a result of IS security training, learners are expected to analyze and solve information 
security-related problems in their work using more diverse perspectives. 
Evaluation of the impact of IS security training at levels 2-4 (Kirkpatrick, 2006) requires a pre- and 
post-research design, with control and experimental groups. We also call for a post-then-pre 
research design with a control group. In the post-then-pre research design, in addition to pre- and 
post-measurements being taken, participants would be asked immediately after training how they 
judged their earlier behavior. The post-then-pre research design should correct participants’ 
previously incorrect views because, after training, participants are expected to better understand 
the training issues (Robinson & Robinson, 1989; Mezoff, 1981).  
4.2. Research Direction 2: Development of Critical-Level Principles 
The meta-theory we presented in this paper explains why only a few of the 32 IS security training 
approaches developed so far are based on pedagogical theories and offer empirical evidence of 
practical usefulness (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). We explain this through three levels of 
thinking. It is normal for practitioners dealing with a phenomenon—here IS security training—to 
have their own beliefs, based on practical experiences and education. These beliefs reside at the 
intuitive level. When people realize that these beliefs may not be valid (in some situations) or are 
not optimal, their thinking matures beyond those thoughts toward the critical level where (Hare, 
1981). While method engineering (Brinkkember, 1996; Kumar & Welke, 1992) and the contingency 
view in management science (Weill & Olson, 1989) have long recognized that there cannot be a 
universal “fit-one-fit all” principle, IS security training literature has not embraced this idea. Hence, 
scholars need to develop critical-level principles for selecting intuitive-level principles. There are 
three reasons why critical thinking is needed (Hare, 1981). First, we need to know the validity of our 
intuitive-level principles. Second, we need to know when general intuitive principles conflict in 
particular cases. Third, we need critical thinking to select the intuitive principles that we will use in a 
given IS security training scenario.  
 
Hence, the aim of research direction 2 is the development of critical-level principles. These 
principles can be inferred by studying the validity of IS security training practices (at the intuitive 
level), within organizations, through the research setting described in research direction 1. When 
developing and testing such principles, paying attention to the context and the conditions under 
which the principles may be valid is important.  
 
Another research issue is how to make a selection when the intuitive principles conflict in particular 
cases. Given that the aim of the critical level is to develop principles to solve situations where 
intuitive-level principles are in conflict, such critical-level principles should be developed. An 
authentic example of such a conflict is when there is a recognized need to implement IS security 
training, but strict deadlines for finalizing software products prevent the training (Puhakainen & 
Siponen, 2010). To address this issue, we also call for research on self-learning (e.g., through a 
web-based system), which employees can undertake at any time. Self-learning should be theory-
based, and follow the research setting described in research direction 1. For example, research 
could compare the effectiveness (to which extent employees comply with IS security policies) and 
cost of the collaborative face-to-face approach based on transformation orientation versus  social 
constructivism and the e-learning IS security training approach based on transmission-orientation 
and behaviorism.  
4.3. Research Direction 3: Development of Evidence-Based Intuitive Level IS 
Security Training Principles 
Future research should develop intuitive-thinking-level IS security training approaches that meet 
the four pedagogical requirements based on meta-level requirements and the social constructivist 
learning paradigm. This study suggested that the experiential learning approach could be used to 
satisfy the four critical-level requirements. In addition, IS security training approaches with different 
constructivist instructional design approaches should be developed and tested for different training 
topics and contexts. Implementing the four pedagogical requirements for IS security training should 
improve learners’ understanding of security-sensitive organizational assets, impending threats, and 
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protection mechanisms (cf., the existentialistic feature of IS security training). Against this 
backdrop, research should be conducted on how IS security training practices can be developed 
based on the existentialistic features. For example, regarding existentialistic features (the existence 
of security-sensitive organizational assets, threats toward them, and protection mechanisms), 
scholars could develop different exercises that attempt to increase employees’ understanding of the 
assets they encounter in their daily work, threats toward these assets, and a mechanism to protect 
the assets. The effect of these techniques should be studied using the research setting described in 
research direction 1. 
5. Conclusions 
Employee non-compliance with IS security policies is considered one of the biggest threats to IS 
security. To solve this problem, researchers have introduced several training approaches in the IS 
security literature. Despite the recognized importance of having effective training, IS security training 
is largely a theoretically underdeveloped area. To fill this gap in research, we develop a new meta-
theory to design IS security training approaches, based on Hare’s theory of three levels of thinking. 
This meta-theory suggests that IS security training differs from other types of training and needs to be 
understood before pedagogical principles for IS security training can be selected. In addition, our 
meta-theory proposes four pedagogical requirements that must be satisfied by any IS security training 
approach. We review the existing IS security training approaches in light of these four requirements 
and find that no previous IS security training approach meets all these requirements. Finally, we 
demonstrate how an IS security training approach can meet these requirements. 
 
The key contribution of the study is the introduction of the new meta-theory for IS security training, 
including four pedagogical requirements for designing IS security training approaches. Finally, we 
advance a research agenda based on the meta-theory for IS security training. 
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Appendix 
With respect to meta-orientations of curriculum design, the results of a review of IS security training 
approaches are shown in Tables 5–8. In the tables, the term “inclusive” means that the IS security 
training approach named contains all the meta-orientations and corresponding learning paradigms. 
In turn, the term “exclusive” indicates that the approach contains only one kind of meta-orientation 
and a corresponding learning paradigm. 
 
The first pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that the  learning theory behind 
the training approach, or the psychological context, must be based upon the group-oriented 
approach to teaching and learning (Fardanesh, 2006; Gibson, 2001; Hinsz et al., 1997). Only six of 
the 32 IS security approaches apply a learning theory at all; however, having a theoretical 
foundation is invaluable for effective training (e.g., McLeod, 2003). The six approaches that do 
apply theory consider learning only from the viewpoint of an individual learner: one approach 
comes exclusively from the transaction orientation (cognitivism), and five approaches derive from 
the transformation orientation (constructivism). Because none of the existing IS security training 
approaches is based on social constructivist learning theory, they are not effective or pedagogically 
meaningful educational practices in this sense (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. The Psychological Context of Learning in the Existing IS Security Training Approaches 
Psychological context of learning within the IS security approaches 
Missing (26) 
Social psychology-oriented approach (Thomson & von Solms 1998), Motivation theory directive approach 
(Roper et al. 2006), Social psychological recommendations approach (Kabay 2002), Normative approach 
(Siponen 2000), Deterrence approach (Straub & Welke 1998), ISD approach (Hansche 2001), Counteractive 
approach (McIlwraith 2006), University environment approach (McCoy & Thurnmond Fowler 2004), Security 
ensuring approach (Peltier 2000), Academic environment approach (Kajava & Siponen 1997), Communication 
oriented approach (Desman 2002), Promotional approach (Rudolph et al. 2002), Preventive approach 
(Nosworthy 2000), Stakeholder approach (Kovacich & Halibozek 2003), Strategic approach (Wilson & Hash 
2003), Competence approach (Wilson et al. 1998), Policy creation approach (Gaunt 1998), Healthcare 
environment approach (Furnell et al. 1997), Social engineering preventive approach (Mitnick & Simon 2002), 
Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox et al. 2001), Briefing approach (Markey 1989), 
Operational controls approach (NIST 1996), Active e-learning approach (Furnel et al. 2002), Traditional e-
learning approach (Kajava et al. 2003), Persuasive technology approach (Forget et al. 2007), Hypermedia 
instruction approach (Shawn et al. 2009) 
 
Transmission Transaction Transformation 



















(Heikka 2008),  
Constructive scenario 
approach  
(Biros 2004),  
Andragogical approach  
(Herold 2005),  
Cyber security game 
approach  
(Cone et al. 2007) 
Pedagogical game 
approach  
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The second pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that the training content must 
be community-centered, i.e., based on learners’ collective experiences and their perspectives (e.g., 
Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001). This is considered a feature of effective IS security training. Twenty-four of 
the 32 IS security training approaches include subject-centered content typical of behaviorism. In 
these approaches, the training content is presented without connections to learning processes, 
problem solving, or learners’ experiences in the training situation. Further, 18 of the approaches 
include process- and/or problem-centered training content, which is typical of a transaction orientation 
and cognitivism, which emphasizes integration of new knowledge with existing knowledge structures 
or cognitive problem solving and analysis (e.g., Palincsar, 1998, 347). Process-centered content 
takes into account the cognitive processing of information (e.g., activation of learners’ prior knowledge 
before a training session and engagement of analogies, case studies, or stories). Problem-centered 
content emphasizes cognitive problem-solving tasks (e.g., analysis and synthesis) as a part of 
training. Finally, 23 approaches include learner-centered content. In these approaches, the training 
content is partly created during a training session according to the learners’ experiences and choices, 
which is typical of the transformation orientation and constructivism. Only two of these 23 approaches 
also include community-centered content typical of social constructivism, which stresses communal 
knowledge formulated during training: the communal relevance of the learning task (the cognitive 
processing approach of Puhakainen (2006)) and the existing corporate culture, expectations, and 
social schemata (the social psychological recommendation approach of Kabay (2002)). (See Table 6.) 
 
Table 6. The Training Content in Existing IS Security Training Approaches 
Training content within the IS security training approaches 
Transmission Transaction Transformation  
Behaviorism                (24) Cognitivism                (18) Constructivism           (23) Social constructivism  (2) 
Inclusive (12) 
Social psychology oriented approach   (Thomson & von Solms 1998) 
Motivation theory directive approach (Roper et al. 2006)  
Social psychological recommendations approach (Kabay 2002)  
Constructive scenario approach (Biros 2004)  
Andragogical approach (Herold 2005) 
ISD approach (Hansche 2001)  
Counteractive approach (McIlwraith 2006)  
Security ensuring approach (Peltier 2000) 
Competence approach (Wilson et al. 1998)  
Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox et al. 2001)  
Social engineering preventive approach (Mitnick & Simon 2002) 
Traditional e-learning approach (Kajava et al. 2003) 
Exclusive (7) 
Deterrence approach (Straub 
& Welke 1998)  
Academic environment 
focused approach (Kajava & 
Siponen 1997)  
Stakeholder approach 
(Kovacich & Halibozek 2003)         
University environment 
approach  
(McCoy & Thurmond Fowler 
2004)  
Preventive approach  
(Nosworthy 2000) 
Healthcare environment 
approach (Furnell et al. 1997)  









Policy creation approach 
(Gaunt 1998)  
Cyber security game 
approach (Cone et al. 2007) 
Active e-learning approach 











Behaviorism + cognitivism (2) 
Communication oriented approach  
(Desman 2002)  
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Table 6. The Training Content in Existing IS Security Training Approaches (continued) 
 
Cognitivism + constructivism (4) 
Cognitive processing approach (Puhakainen 2006) 
Pedagogical game approach  
(Greitzer et al. 2007) 
Persuasive technology approach (Forget et al. 2007) 
Hypermedia instruction approach  






approach (Heikka 2008)   
Operational controls 
approach  (NIST 1996) 
Strategic approach  (Wilson 
& Hash 2003)             
 Behaviorism + 
constructivism (3) 
Constructive instruction 
approach  (Heikka 2008)   
Operational controls 
approach  (NIST 1996) 
Strategic approach  (Wilson 
& Hash 2003)             
 
 






approach (Kabay 2002)  
 
The third pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that the teaching methods need 
to focus on critical reflection of collective knowledge and experiences through authentic problem 
solving or communication, i.e., they must include collaborative learning techniques in order to 
reveal and produce collective knowledge (e.g., Barkley et al., 2005). These techniques are 
preferred for effective IS security training. With respect to the teaching methods explored, 24 
approaches represent the transmission orientation and behaviorism. These teaching/learning 
activities facilitate teachers in transmitting knowledge and learners in receiving knowledge or 
external reinforcement of their behavior. Nine of the 24 approaches employ transaction-oriented 
teaching methods. Teaching methods that represent the transaction orientation and cognitivism 
support the cognitive processing of information, implement activities of cognitive problem solving 
and analysis, or both. Finally, 23 approaches include teaching methods that represent the 
transformation orientation and constructivism. In these cases, the teaching methods emphasize the 
opportunities to reflect on one’s own experiences, authentic problem solving, or both. Along with 
individual activities, 14 approaches representing transformative teaching methods also include 
solitary references to collaborative learning activities in the learning situation, such as role-playing 
exercises and scenario discussion (Thompson and von Solms, 1998; Roper et al., 2006; Heikka, 
2008; Biros, 2004; Siponen, 2000; Herold, 2005; McIlwraith, 2006; Peltier, 2000; Wilson et al., 
1998; Gaunt, 1998; Mitnick and Simon, 2002; Cox et al., 2001; Greitzer et al., 2007; Kajava et al., 
2003). However, the purpose of the collaboration is to enhance individual learning, not to achieve 
socially constructed knowledge and emphasize the communal characteristic of learning. Therefore, 
teaching methods in these cases represent constructivism. Only two approaches also include 
collaborative teaching methods that emphasize the communal characteristic of learning. These two 
are Puhakainen’s (2006) cognitive processing approach that seeks the communal relevance of a 
learning task through a team rehearsal and Kabay’s (2002) social psychological recommendations 
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Table 7. Teaching Methods in the Existing IS Security Training Approaches 
Teaching method within the IS security training approaches 
Transmission Transaction Transformation 
Behaviorism                       (24) Cognitivism (9) Constructivism       (23) Social constructivism  (2) 
Inclusive (8) 
Motivation theory directed approach (Roper et al. 2006)  
Andragogical approach (Herold 2005)  
Counteractive approach (McIlwraith 2006)  
ISD approach (Hansche 2001) 
Strategic approach (Wilson & Hash 2003) 
Operational controls approach (NIST 1996)  
Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox et al. 2001)  
Competence approach (Wilson et al. 1998) 
Exclusive (8) 
Deterrence approach  
(Straub & Welke 1998) 
Communication oriented 
approach (Desman 2002)   
University environment 
approach (McCoy & 




(Kovacich & Halibozek 2003)  
Healthcare environment 
approach (Furnell et al. 
1997) 
Briefing approach (Markey 
1989)  
Promotional approach 




Normative approach  
(Siponen 2000)  
Cognitive processing 
approach (Puhakainen 2006)  
Constructive instruction 
approach (Heikka 2008)  
Policy creation approach 
(Gaunt 1998)  
Cyber security game 
approach (Cone et al. 2007)  
Pedagogical game approach   
(Greitzer et al. 2007)  
Active learning approach 
(Furnell et al. 2002) 
Hypermedia instruction 
approach (Shawn et al. 2009) 
Exclusive (0) 
 
Behaviorism + cognitivism (1) 







(Kabay 2002)  
Constructive scenario 
approach (Biros 2004) 
Security ensuring approach 
(Peltier 2000)  
Social engineering 
preventive approach  
(Mitnick & Simon  2002) 
Persuasive technology 
approach (Forget et al. 2007) 
Social psychology oriented 
approach (Thomson & von 
Solms 1998) 
Traditional e-learning 
approach (Kajava et al. 
2003) 




(Kabay 2002)  
Constructive scenario 
approach (Biros 2004) 
Security ensuring approach 
(Peltier 2000)  
Social engineering preventive 
approach  
(Mitnick & Simon  2002) 
Persuasive technology 
approach (Forget et al. 2007) 
Social psychology oriented 
approach (Thomson & von 
Solms 1998) 
Traditional e-learning 
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   Social constructivism (2) 
Social psychological 
recommendations 





The fourth pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that informal, experimental, and 
open-ended forms of evaluation for groups need to be applied. This means that assessment of 
learning must emphasize experiential and communication-based methods from the viewpoint of the 
learning community (e.g., Derry and DuRussel, 2000). Transmission-oriented evaluation practices 
appear in 17 approaches. These evaluation practices include various ways to measure the repetition 
of knowledge (e.g., multiple-choice questions and security quizzes), or observe changes in a real or 
simulated working environment without instant feedback (competence-based evaluation). These are 
distinctive features of behaviorist evaluation practices. Typical evaluation of transaction and 
cognitivism is performed in five approaches, where the object of evaluation is adaptation of learned 
knowledge and problem solving through interactive exercises, case studies, or essay questions. In 15 
approaches, features of the transformation orientation and constructivism are identified in the 
suggestions for conducting evaluation practices. Hence, these conversational evaluation practices 
are characterized as informal, experimental, and/ or open-ended. Typical evaluations include self-
assessments, interviews, and feedback during the instruction. In addition, along with evaluating 
individual learners, three approaches stress communication as the purpose of evaluation, which is 
viewed as a feature of effective educational practice: corrective feedback during the group 
assignment (Puhakainen’s (2006) cognitive processing approach), role-play scenarios and focus 
groups (Herold’s (2005) andragogical approach), and group interviews (Wilson and Hash’s (2003) 
strategic approach). (See Table 8.) 
 
Table 8. Evaluation of Learning in the Existing IS Security Training Approaches 
Evaluation of learning within the IS security training approaches 
Missing (10) 
Social psychological recommendations approach (Kabay 2002), Normative approach (Siponen 2000), 
Deterrence approach (Straub and Welke 1998), Academic environment approach (Kajava & Siponen 1997), 
University environment approach (McCoy & Thurmond Fowler 2004), ISD approach (Hansche 2001), Policy 
creation approach (Gaunt 1998), Healthcare environment approach (Furnell et al. 1997), Discursive approach 
and online tutorial approach (Cox et al. 2001), Briefing approach (Markey 1989) 
Transmission Transmission Transmission 
Behaviorism (17) Cognitivism   (5) Constructivism  (15) Social constructivism (3) 
Inclusive (2) 
Competence approach (Wilson et al. 1998) 
Hypermedia instruction approach (Shawn et al. 2009) 
Exclusive (5) 
Security ensuring 
approach (Peltier 2000)  
Communication oriented 
approach (Desman 2002)  
Stakeholder approach 
(Kovacich & Halibozek 
2003)  
Social engineering 
preventive approach  
(Mitnick & Simon 2002) 
Traditional e-learning 






approach (Heikka 2008)  
Cyber security game 
approach (Cone et al. 
2007) 
 Active e-learning 
approach (Furnell et al. 
2002) 
Persuasive technology 
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Behaviorism + cognitivism (2) 
Constructive scenario approach (Biros 2004) 
Operational controls approach (NIST 1996) 
  
 
Cognitivism + constructivism (1) 
Pedagogical  game approach  
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Table 8. Evaluation of Learning in the Existing IS Security Training Approaches (continued) 
Behaviorism + 
constructivism (8) 
Social psychology oriented 
approach (Thomson & von 
Solms 1998)  
Motivation theory directive 
approach  






Counteractive  approach 
(McIlwraith 2006)  
Promotional approach 
(Rudolph et al. 2002)  
Preventive approach 
(Nosworthy 2000) 
Strategic approach (Wilson 




Social psychology oriented 
approach (Thomson & von 
Solms 1998)  
Motivation theory directive 






(Herold 2005)  
Counteractive  approach 
(McIlwraith 2006)  
Promotional approach 
(Rudolph et al. 2002)  
Preventive approach 
(Nosworthy 2000) 
Strategic approach (Wilson 
& Hash 2003) 
 
   
Social constructivism (3) 
Cognitive processing 
approach  
(Puhakainen 2006)  
Andragogical approach 
(Herold 2005)   
Strategic approach  
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